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ABSTRACT
Moving Target Defense is a technique focused on disrupting certain phases of a
cyber-attack. The static nature of the existing networks gives the adversaries an adequate
amount of time to gather enough data concerning the target and succeed in mounting an
attack. The random host address mutation is a well-known MTD technique that hides the
actual IP address from external scanners. When the host establishes a session of
transmitting or receiving data, due to mutation interval, the session is interrupted, leading
to the host’s unavailability. Moving the network configuration creates overhead on the
controller and additional switching costs resulting in latency, poor performance, packet
loss, and jitter.
In this dissertation, we proposed a novel discrete MTD technique in softwaredefined networking (SDN) to individualize the mutation interval for each host. The host IP
address is changed at different intervals to avoid the termination of the existing sessions
and to increase complexity in understanding mutation intervals for the attacker. We use the
flow statistics of each host to determine if the host is in a session of transmitting or
receiving data. Individualizing the mutation interval of each host enhances the defender
game strategy making it complex in determining the pattern of mutation interval. Since the
mutation of the host address is achieved using a pool of virtual (temporary) host addresses,
a subnet game strategy is introduced to increase complexity in determining the network
topology. A benchmarking framework is developed to measure the performance,
scalability, and reliability of the MTD network with the traditional network. The analysis
shows the discrete MTD network outperforms the random MTD network in all tests.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Moving Target Defense (MTD) [1] protects the network by changing the
configurations frequently. The attacker gathers the information of the network at the initial
phase of the cyber kill chain [2]. The traditional network configuration does not change
from time to time, and it is static. This static configuration will give the attacker sufficient
time to gather network information. Once the attacker collects the data, there is no looking
back because the static network does not change its configuration. MTD technique aims to
disrupt the reconnaissance attacks on the network by changing the network configuration
frequently. Even though the attacker collects the information of the network, the attacks
fail because the network configuration will have changed.
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [3] simplifies the need to have the physical
infrastructure, and it allows to centralize the control plane to manage the whole network
[4]. It separates the control plane from the network device’s data plane. It also simplifies
the network management, operational cost and enables the programmability of the
controller.
1.2 Contributions
The research work contributions are as follows:
1. A MAC address dynamic mutation technique [5] is developed and implemented on
the drone wireless network, including intrusion detection system and enhanced
security with wireless network encryption. The drone’s MAC address is used to
launch a cyber-attack. The hacker collects the configuration of the drone network
by scanning. Once the information is gathered, the hacker does not need to re-scan
15

since the wireless network of the drone is static. We developed an MTD technique
to mutate the static MAC address of the drone frequently. Since the MAC address
is changing from time to time, the attacker will be unsuccessful in launching an
attack on the network using the network configuration information collected
previously.
2. A random host address mutation technique [6] is developed in software-defined
networking (SDN), and network analysis is shown. The mutation of the host IP
addresses of all hosts is implemented at a random time in the network. The IP
address mutation is a widely researched technique, and it provides network security
by assigning a virtual IP address to the host at a frequent time interval. The mutation
technique provides security to the network and also creates an overhead for
changing the host’s configuration by the SDN controller. We implemented the host
address mutation technique, and the performance of the network is shown by
benchmarking with the traditional network.
3. In software-defined networking, we have developed a new discrete host address
mutation technique [7] to individualize the mutation interval of each host in the
network. In random host address mutation, the IP addresses of all hosts are changed
at the same interval, terminating the established session between the hosts
deteriorating the network stability. To overcome this backlog, a discrete host
address mutation is developed to individualize the mutation interval of each host.
Individualizing the mutation interval of each host makes it complex for the attacker
to figure out the pattern of the mutation interval. The mutation interval of each host
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is based on the flow statistics of the host monitored by the controller. The controller
changes the IP address of the host when there is no exchange of data.
4. We developed an IP subnet game strategy using private virtual IP addresses. The
virtual IP addresses are selected randomly from the pool of different IP subnets to
make it complex for the attacker to understand the network topology. A
benchmarking framework is developed to measure the stability of the network in
terms of performance, scalability, and reliability.
1.3 Dissertation Structure
The dissertation structure is as follows. In chapter I, the objectives of the research
work, motivation, and contribution are outlined. Chapter II introduces the research topic
and related work. In chapter III, we discuss the software and networking tools used in this
research. Chapter IV discusses the proposed moving target defense techniques for network
security, and benchmarking results are demonstrated. Finally, chapter V concludes the
research objectives and outcomes along with the future works.
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CHAPTER II- BACKGROUND
2.1 Moving Target Defense
MTD reactively changes the configuration of the system across multiple planes.
The mutation of the attack surface increases complexity and uncertainty in understanding
the system behavior leading to rising in scanning costs for the attacker. The MTD technique
changes the static system into a dynamic, enhancing the security of the system.
Reconnaissance [8] is the initial phase of the cyber kill chain [2].
The attacker gathers the system’s data by scanning the network extensively using
multiple hacking tools. If the system is static, the data collected by the attacker will be used
to initiate the cyber-attack on the network. The operational cost for scanning the network
is high, and when the system is static, the attacker avoids scanning the system multiple
times. Since the MTD technique changes the attack surface [9] frequently, the attacker has
to put the high cost in scanning the system numerous times.
The dynamic changes in the system configuration can evade these attacks since the
attacker uses static system information. Even though the cyber-attack is launched on the
system, the attack fails due to the system configuration change.
2.1.1 Moving Target Defense Techniques Categories
The categories [2] that moving target defense techniques can be applied are shown
in Figure 1.1.

18

Figure 1.1 Moving Target Defense Categories
1. Data Mutation: The data format, encoding, representation, and syntax are changed
dynamically.
2. Software Application Code Mutation: The application program code is changed
dynamically by modifying instructions, grouping, format, and order.
3. Runtime Environment: The application environment is changed dynamically
during execution.
(a) Mutation of Address Space: The memory layout where the program
code is located is changed dynamically.
(b) Mutation of Instruction Set: The application’s interface is changed
dynamically.
4. Platform Properties Mutation: The mutation of the operating system’s version,
the architecture of the CPU, etc.
5. Mutation of Network Properties: The mutation of the network configuration of
the system, which includes IP address, MAC address, and port number, etc.
19

2.1.2

Cyber Kill Chain
Cyber kill chain [2] refers to the series of steps followed by the attacker in

successfully launching a cyber-attack, as shown in Figure 1.2. The following are the
different phases of the cyber kill chain:
1. Reconnaissance/Scanning: This is the initial phase in which the attacker scans the
network and collects the data.
2. Access: Using the gathered network information, the attacker identifies the network
properties, configuration, and vulnerabilities of the network. The vulnerabilities
identified helps the attacker to make the initial communication with the target.
3. Exploit Development: The vulnerability identified by the attacker is used to
develop an exploit for privilege escalation.
4. Attack Launch: The cyber-attack on the network is launched on the target by
delivering the exploit developed using phishing, USB drive, etc.
5. Persistence: The attacker should be persistent in the network to take over or control
the network by creating and installing backdoors.

Figure 1.2 Cyber Kill Chain
2.2 Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
Software-defined networking [10] [11] separates the data plane and control plane
of the network when compared to a traditional network, as shown in Figure 2.1. The
controller in the control plane is centralized and takes the decisions of the network flow
20

from one point to another. The data plane transmits the data according to the path provided
by the controller. The network devices forward the traffic to the controller if the network
flow path is not available in the data plane. According to the destination address, the
controller will decide the route, install the flow in the network devices, and use that flow
for future data traffic forwarding. The controller uses the popular OpenFlow protocol [12]
to communicate with network devices. The controller gives the flexibility by
programmability to control and configure the network devices when required.
Even though the SDN architecture provides many advantages, limitations [13] also
exist. In terms of reliability, if the controller fails [14], then the network will be down
because of no control over the network devices and configuration. The backup controller
will take over if configured. In SDN, the attackers will likely target the controller to take
down the entire network until the backup controller becomes active. The controller has
limited control session capacity, which is a drawback in terms of scalability.

Figure 2.1 SDN Concept
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CHAPTER III– SOFTWARE AND NETWORKING TOOLS
This chapter introduces the software tools used in this research: SDN, OpenFlow,
RYU controller, and Mininet.
3.1 SDN Architecture
OpenFlow [12] is an open standard for a communications protocol that makes the
control plane to decouple from the forwarding plane of numerous devices and
communicate with it from a single point, allowing for more functionality and
programmability.
Network devices, controllers, and applications are the essential components of
SDN. Features for deciding incoming traffic forwarding are included in SDN devices. The
SDN controller manages network devices and provides SDN applications with an
abstraction of the network infrastructure at the southbound. The controller enables an SDN
application to specify traffic flows and pathways on network devices in terms of common
packet characteristics to meet its demands and to respond to changing user and
traffic/network conditions. As shown in Figure 3.1, the Open Networking Foundation
defines a high-level design for SDN [15] with three primary layers.
Infrastructure Layer. All the physical and virtual network device will be present
in this layer. A packet-processing component, an abstraction layer, and an application
program interface (API) at northbound for communication with the controller make up an
SDN device. An SDN device is abstracted as a set of flow tables by the abstraction layer.
By assessing incoming packets against flow table entries, the packet processing function
determines forwarding action.

22

Control Layer. This layer provides logically centralized control capability that
supervises network forwarding behavior. All SDN devices that make up the network
architecture are controlled by an SDN controller, which uses a southbound API to
implement policy decisions like routing, forwarding, and load balancing. Through a
northbound interface, it gives apps an abstract view of the entire network.
Application Layer. End-user apps that employ SDN communications and network
services make up this layer [16]. Applications can manage the underlying infrastructure
behavior by adding flows to forward packets through the optimal path between the
endpoints, load balancing across multiple paths or endpoints, reacting network topology
changes such as the addition of new devices and paths, link failures, or redirecting traffic.

Figure 3.1 SDN Architecture and OpenFlow
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3.2 OpenFlow
The southbound connection between an OpenFlow switch controller is defined by
OpenFlow, a standardized protocol (Open Networking Foundation 2013). The
communication messages between the two are sent over a secure channel, which is
implemented over TCP using a Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection. The controller
defines and programs the switch’s packet forwarding behavior through the exchange of
commands and packets. The switch then executes packet forwarding and reports its
configuration status.
The characteristics of user traffic are used to classify it into flows. An OpenFlow
switch monitors for packets and forwards them according to the flow to which they belong.
A flow is a path in which packets are sent from one network endpoint (or group of
endpoints) to another (or set of endpoints). Endpoints can be IP-TCP/UDP address pairs,
VLAN endpoints, or switch input-output ports.

3.3 OpenFlow Switch
The OpenFlow logical switch contains at least one flow table and a group table to
check the flow and forward data, as shown in Figure 3.2.
3.3.1

Flow Tables
The controller can add, delete, and update flow entries in flow tables both reactively

(in reaction to packets) and proactively (in advance) using the OpenFlow switch protocol.
Reactive Flow Entries. The path from one node to another is called a flow. A
reactive flow entry is created in the flow table when a host tries to communicate with
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another host, and if the path exists, then the controller reactively installs the flow in the
flow table.
Proactive Flow Entries: The flow entry is installed in the flow table ahead of time
before the hosts communicate with each other.

Figure 3.2 OpenFlow Switch
3.4 RYU Controller
Ryu is a Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Labs-sponsored opensource controller [17] written entirely in Python. It supports OpenFlow and connects with
OpenStack. It is a centralized controller [18] with a simple API that creates new control
applications and network management for network developers and operators. Components
written in other programming languages can also be supported by Ryu. Ryu is popularly
used for cloud infrastructures, data centers, and carrier networks. In communications,
infrastructure services, event management, and application management, Ryu components
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can be useful. NETCONF, OF-config, and OpenFlow 1.0 to 1.5 are among the network
management protocols supported by Ryu, as shown in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3 RYU Controller
3.5 Mininet
Mininet [19] is a network emulator, or more precisely, an orchestration framework
for network emulation. On a single Linux kernel, it runs a collection of switches, end-hosts,
routers, and links. It employs lightweight virtualization to make a single machine appear
to be a full network with the same kernel, operating system, and user code. You can ssh
into a Mininet host and execute any software you want. Your programs can send packets
over what appears to be a real Ethernet interface, with a set link speed and latency. With a
certain level of queueing, packets are processed by the switch, router, or middlebox. When
two applications interact through Mininet, such as using an iPerf tool, the performance
measured should be comparable to native machines.

26

In brief, Mininet’s switches, virtual hosts, controllers, and connections are real, and
they are made of software [20] rather than hardware and behave similarly to discrete
hardware pieces for the most part. It is usually possible to construct a Mininet network that
looks like a hardware network or, in reverse, a hardware network that looks like a Mininet
network and runs the same apps and binary code on any platform.
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CHAPTER IV – MOVING TARGET DEFENSE APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS
This chapter introduces the moving target defense techniques for network security.
The application of these techniques not only provides security [21] but also creates
overheads on the controller resulting in data loss. We proposed a new discrete host address
mutation technique that can be more stable and reduce data loss.
4.1 MAC Address Mutation in Drones
The number of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), sometimes known as drones
[22], is continuously increasing. Because they weigh less, cost less, and manageable, they
are utilized in the military [23], aid in monitoring [24] [25], emergency disasters [26], and
rescue operations [27]. In the telecommunications business [28], UAVs are employed to
extend wireless network coverage. Amazon Prime Air [29] is a service from Amazon that
will deliver products using drones.
Drones have many advantages, but they are vulnerable to physical difficulties and
cyber-attacks. Satellites, cellular phones, Wi-Fi, GPS, and ZigBee, are all common ways
to send and receive data via a network. In 2009, Iraqi rebels hacked into the feed [30] of
the predator drone. In 2011, a virus attacked the networks utilized by US Air Force drone
pilots at Air Force Base, Creech, Nevada [31]. Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel is an
American drone [32] captured by an Iranian cyberwarfare outfit in 2011. Without the
operator’s knowledge, the predator drone video feeds were made public online [33]. Such
attacks are carried out with the use of low-cost wireless network jammers and GPS
spoofing devices.
Contributions. In this study, various vulnerabilities of UAVs and hacking techniques, as
well as existing defense measures for countering cyber-attacks, are investigated. We built
28

a base station and used a popular hacking method on the UAV Parrot AR Drone to
demonstrate the drone’s weaknesses and exploitation. It demonstrates that an attacker can
do significant harm by crashing drone or hack it and take control by compromising the
wireless network between the operator and the drone. The experiment demonstrates the
significance of protecting UAV systems against cyber-attacks.
4.1.1 Related Work
Various defense strategies against drone attacks have been presented. Nils Miro
Rodday et al. proposed [34] using safe encryption techniques for Wi-Fi access in their
paper. Johann Pleban et al. demonstrated [35] how to encrypt a wireless network using the
drone as a client and the RC as an access point in their paper. To prevent an adversary from
hacking into the drone, the open Wi-Fi network is encrypted with WPA. Chaitanya Rani et
al. outlined [36] the flaws in encryption detection systems and proposed encryption
detection systems as a protection strategy. A risk assessment scheme for communication
infrastructure and services was created by Kim Hartmann and Christoph Steup [37]. The
severity of a cyber-attack was assessed by James Goppert et al., who devised [38] a metric
to reflect the system’s period of complete failure. Robert Mitchell and Ing-Ray Chen [39]
created a behavior rule-based UAV intrusion detection system in order to capture and
continue harmful activity when a UAV is attacked.
4.1.2 Hacking Techniques
UAV wireless network attacking tactics are explored in this section. The results of
our hacking experiment on the most popular drones are displayed below. When an attacker
knows the drone’s MAC address he wants to attack, he can gain access to its wireless
network. Drone assaults on wireless networks can take the following forms:
29

•

Data packet capture

•

Denial of service (DoS) attack

•

Man-in-the-middle attack (MIMA)

4.1.2.1 Data Packet Capture
The hacker uses a data packet capture method to collect the required information
about the target. For example, the remote-control device controlling the drone, MAC
addresses

of

the

drone,

wireless

network

channel,

the

encryption

type

(WEP/WPA/WPA2/OPN), etc., are sent out by the drone’s wireless network, which can be
collected. The tools used to capture wireless network frames are Aircrack-ng and
Wireshark.
4.1.2.2 Denial-of-Service Attack
De-authentication flood attacks (DoS) [41] compromise wireless network [40]
access points. The targeted access point’s RAM is depleted by continuous deauthentication requests sent by the hacker. As a result, the clients cannot reach the access
point because there is no memory left to reconnect, leaving them without a connection. The
DoS attack will target the MAC address access point to disconnect all the devices
connected to it or target a specific MAC address (drone or remote controller) to disconnect
it from the network. The DoS attack is shown in Figure. 4.1.
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Figure 4.1 Denial of Service Attack
4.1.2.3 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
The attacker spoofs the communication network between the drone and the operator
of the remote-control device (RCD) and takes control of it. He can transmit the
authentication commands to the drone as if he were the original RC user as shown in Figure
4.2. The hacker will be able to see the location and drone’s data feed without the drone’s
or the RC user’s knowledge. If the wireless network is password-protected, Aircrack-ng
and crunch programs can access the authentication keys through the handshake protocol.

Figure 4.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attack
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4.1.3 Cyber-Attack on Drones
On the drone static network, DoS attack is implemented on Parrot A.R drone. By
repeatedly transmitting de-authentication commands, the remote-control device is
unplugged from the drone. The drone will either crash or the attacker will be able to take
control of it by attaching it to his device. A wireless bridge adapter Alfa AWUS036NHA
is utilized in a virtual computer running Kali Linux. Aircrack-ng [42] is a toolkit that
includes everything needed to take down a drone. The commands for attacking the drone
are as follows:
# iwconfig wlan0 mode monitor
# ifconfig up
# aireplay-ng -9 wlan0
# airodump-ng wlan0

Figure 4.3 MAC Address Detection
A data capture attack on a wireless network is launched using the above commands,
resulting in collecting beacon frames containing destination and source MAC addresses of
the devices in the network. The MAC address of the drone and the controlling device
commanding the drone are displayed in Figure 4.3.
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root@kali: ~# aireplay-ng -0 0 -a drone BSSID -c remotecontrol BSSID wlan0
The drone will be disconnected from the network leading it to crash or take over by
the attacker, as shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.4 Communication Link Before DoS Attack

Figure 4.5 Communication Link After DoS Attack
4.1.4 Defense against cyber attacks
We proposed the following defense techniques for the drone’s wireless network
security.
•

Wireless network encryption
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•

Intrusion detection system (IDS)

•

Moving target defense (MTD)

Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7 shows the architecture and base station model.

Figure 4.6 System Architecture

Figure 4.7 Base Station
The Raspberry Pi, as shown in Figure 4.8 is a low-cost computer that may be used
for a variety of projects. We are utilizing it as an intermediate router [43] to create a secure
wireless network between the drone and the remote control. It is set up to function as a
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hotspot, bringing devices into the network and establishing a communication link between
them. The drone sends live video feed to the laptop via raspberry pi router and controlling
commands to the drone are send using laptop via raspberry pi router. WPA2 encryption is
used to secure the raspberry pi wireless network.

Figure 4.8 Raspberry Pi
The Robot Operating System (ROS) in Figure 4.9 contains tools and libraries to
develop reliable robotic applications. As part of this, ROS includes an AR drone driver that
can communicate and control the drone. We can create autonomous tasks for the
drone using ROS [44].

Figure 4.9 ROS Model
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4.1.4.1 Wireless Network Encryption
Multiple devices can connect to the AR drone because it will operate as it’s network
is unencrypted and open, and it acts as an access point, but only one device can control it.
The drone is compromised when the real user is disconnected, and the false user reconnects
to the drone. Installing the WPA supplicant compiled libraries [45] into the drone libraries
encrypts the drone’s wireless network with WPA2 security, as shown in Figure 4.10. To
achieve this, the drone’s bin folder should have the binaries WPA CLI, WPA pass, and
WPA supplicant. After the binaries have been installed successfully, the drone will stop
functioning as an access point and connect to the specified access point name and password
(in our case, it will connect to the raspberry pi).

Figure 4.10 WPA Binaries in AR Drone
4.1.4.2 Intrusion Detection System
The wireless network is monitored in real-time by an intrusion detection system.
Intrusion is defined as unauthorized access to a network without the knowledge of the
network administrator. The systems can be hacked or spoofed, giving the unauthorized
person immediate access.
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IDS monitors the network but does not prevent cyber-attacks. It detects the
anomalies in the network and notifies the user in case of any suspicious activity. We used
Kismet wireless IDS [46] for network monitoring, as shown in Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11 Kismet IDS
4.1.4.3 Moving Target Defense
The MAC address mutation technique is implemented in raspberry pi. Figure. 4. 12
shows the MTD model.

Figure 4.12 Moving Target Defense Model
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4.1.5 Configuration
Kismet configuration file is created to monitor and detect malicious activities on
the network. The alerts configured are shown below:
#kismet.conf
alert=LUCENTTEST,10/min,1/sec alert=DEAUTHFLOOD,10/min,2/sec
alert=NETSTUMBLER,10/min,1/sec alert=WELLENREITER,10/min,1/sec
alert=AIRJACKSSID,5/min,1/sec alert=PROBENOJOIN,10/min,1/sec
alert=BCASTDISCON,10/min,2/sec alert=CHANCHANGE,5/min,1/sec
alert=BSSTIMESTAMP,10/min,1/sec alert=MSFBCOMSSID,10/min,1/sec
alert=DISASSOCTRAFFIC,10/min,1/sec alert=NULLPROBERESP,10/min,1/sec
alert=MSFNETGEARBEACON,10/min,1/sec
alert=LONGSSID,10/min,1/sec alert=MSFDLINKRATE,10/min,1/sec
alert=DEAUTHCODEINVALID,10/min,1/sec
alert=DISCONCODEINVALID,10/min,1/sec
# Do we have a GPS?
gps=false
# Log file directory
configdir=/var/log/kismet/
The MAC address mutation technique is implemented using the macchanger tool
libraries by executing the following script, and the model is shown in Figure 4.13.
#! /bin/bash
macchanger --show wlan0
Ifconfig wlan0 down
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macchanger -r -b wlan0
Ifconfig wlan0 up
macchanger --show wlan0
sudo service network-manager start

Figure 4.13 MAC Address Mutation Model
4.1.6 Results
We implemented Data capture attack and DoS attack on the wireless network of the
drone. Kismet IDS detects the cyber-attack, and an alert is generated for the malicious
activity on the network. Figure 4.14 shows the data captured by scanning the network,
including MAC addresses and network encryption type. The MAC addresses under the
station columns are the addresses of the drone and laptop controlling the drone.

Figure 4.14 Data Capture Attack
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root@kali: ~# aireplay-ng -0 0 -a drone BSSID -c remotecontrol BSSID wlan0
The above command is used to implement DoS attack on the wireless network of
the drone. The MAC address of the raspberry pi is targeted to take down the network and
crash the drone. Figure 4.15 shows the DoS attack on the raspberry pi whose network is
named as hotspot detected by the kismet IDS.

Figure 4.15 Kismet IDS Alerts
As soon as the alerts are generated by the IDS, if the mutation time interval is not
reached, the MAC address of the hotspot is changed immediately to prevent the cyberattack. Since the MAC address is changed, the attacker launching the attack with the old
MAC address will be failed. Figure 4.16 shows the kismet detecting the new MAC address
of the hotspot after mutation.

Figure 4.16 New MAC Address After Mutation 1
After a short interval, the MAC address will be changed again dynamically, and
kismet detects the new MAC address of the drone in Figure 4.17.

Figure 4.17 New MAC Address After Mutation 2
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The attacker continues to implement cyber-attack on the wireless network using
configuration gathered in data capture attack. Since the network is dynamic and the MAC
address is changed dynamically, the attack on the network fails, as shown in Figure 4.18.

Figure 4.18 Unsuccessful Cyber-Attack
Some of the useful data transmitted from the drone to the base station are camera
feeds, altitude, motor speeds, navigational data, acceleration, and velocity values which
are shown in Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20.

Figure 4.19 Navigational Data from the Drone
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Figure 4.20 Acceleration and Velocity Plots

4.2 Random Host Address Mutation and Analysis in SDN
As discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2, The MTD technique changes the static system
into a dynamic, enhancing the system’s security, and Software-defined networking
separates the data plane and control plane of the network compared to a traditional network.
Contribution. We developed a random host address mutation technique in
software-defined networking, and network analysis is shown. The mutation of the host IP
addresses of all hosts is implemented at a random time in the network. The IP address
mutation is a widely researched technique, and it provides network security by assigning a
virtual IP address to the host at a time interval. Thus, the mutation technique not only
provides security to the network but also it creates an overhead for changing the host’s
configuration by the SDN controller. We implemented the host address mutation technique,
and the performance of the network is shown by benchmarking against the traditional
network.
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4.2.1 Related Work
The adversaries in Dynamic Network Address Translation (DYNAT) [47] [48] use
most of their time monitoring the network. To prevent malicious scanning, DYNAT
substitutes the TCP/IP header information. Trusted users are given predefined essential
parameters that ensure the service’s availability. The network overhead can be high
depending on the fields obfuscated and deployment. Obfuscating the MAC address and
deploying it on a switched network, for example, could cause the switches to overheat and
drastically increase ARP traffic complexity to route switch port packets accordingly. To
handle the routing overhead, more hardware may be necessary.
Revere [49] is a technique in which an open overlay is created. An overlay network is
a dynamic network example that may change pathways, rearrange itself, and adapt to
dynamically downed links or nodes. The additional traffic on the network is caused by the
control messages transmitted between nodes. Unknown network overheads can be imposed
by reconfiguration and routing.
RITAS [50] (Randomized Intrusion-Tolerant Asynchronous Services) is an acronym
for Randomized Intrusion-Tolerant Asynchronous Services. On top of IPSec and TCP, it
creates fault-tolerant consensus-based protocols. To run multiple resources, additional
resources are needed and when the protocols are in the process of negotiation, additional
time is required creating execution overhead. Running additional services than required
due to mutation also created memory overhead. To each packet header an extra 24 bytes
will be added by IPSec. As protocols come to an agreement, more network traffic is
generated. An aggregate of 30% latency to each protocol is added by IPSec.
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Antonatos et al. suggested Network Address Space Randomization (NASR) [51]. In
order to detect worm attacks, endpoints that have been in the process of becoming infected
or already infected are examined. DHCP changes the information of endpoints. Due to the
mutation of IP addresses, connections are discarded or dropped, and network overhead is
created.
A Mutable Network (MUTE) [52] allows network hosts to modify their host addresses
and port numbers. The system configuration and real IP address are not changed to the
current network it is a virtual overlay. Over the virtual relay, the traffic is routed
independently. Host IP address data is synchronized through encrypted channels. An
overhead on network infrastructure, including switches and routers, will be present.
Additional routing overhead may cause network infrastructure to fail.
Inside a bigger outer virtual overlay network, Dynamic Backbone (DynaBone) [53]
produces several inner virtual overlay networks. Inner networks improve diversity by using
alternative networking, routing protocols, and hosting a distinct protocol or service. The
hosts of the outer overlay network are unaware of the inner networks that make up one
network. At the internal overlays, sensors are used to monitor traffic and performance.
Depending on the routing protocols and networking utilized in the network, additional
latency will be introduced. There is also a reduction in bandwidth. Overheads are caused
by encryption and authentication protocols. There is no way of knowing how much
network infrastructure and additional routing will be used.
Active Repositioning in Cyberspace for Synchronized Evasion (ARCSYNE) [54] is a
mechanism that changes VPN gateway IP addresses using the gateway kernel OS. Using a
clocking mechanism, while engaging in hopping, a secret is shared by the gateway. At each
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clock tick, a virtual IP address using secret is generated by the gateway. Each gateway
calculates the IP addresses of the other gateways in the same way. IP address hopping and
streaming services have no effect on the gateways. For a grace period, the gateways allow
data packets even after the IP address has changed. The time it takes for a data packet to
go from one gateway to the next is the grace period. Updating the data packets address
information has an impact on delivery delays, which is referred to as network overhead.
Random Host Mutation (RHM) [55] is a system that frequently modifies routable IP
addresses. Temporary IP addresses are assigned to hosts that are mapped to actual IP
addresses by RHM. The virtual IP addresses have a brief lifespan and are replaced at
random and in a consistent manner. A special (MTG) gateway at the network edge converts
the real IP address to a virtual IP address. Hostnames that DNS translates to the real IP
address can be used to contact the IP address changing hosts, which was then converted to
a virtual IP address before being sent to the originating hosts. Hosts can communicate with
one other using their real IP addresses with the help of MT Controller permission. Sessions
are kept open until the current flows are closed. TAP network kernel devices or OpenFlow
virtual switches [56] are used for address mapping. For maintaining sessions during
mutation, address-space overhead is created. Because of the frequent mutations that cause
routing-update overhead, the routing table has grown in size.
OpenFlow Random Host Mutation (OF-RHM) [57] changes host IP addresses that are
routable on a regular basis. The host's actual addresses are not modified. By ensuring
consistency, the host’s routable short-lived virtual IP addresses are established and
regularly altered. RHM gateways and RHM controllers in OF-RHM are OpenFlow
switches and OpenFlow controllers. An Open Flow controller converts to real IP addresses
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from virtual IP addresses. It also uses OpenFlow messages across the switch to synchronize
virtual IP mutations. End-host address assignments and DNS messages are controlled, as
is the implementation of flow rules in the switches. By maintaining flows and assigning IP
addresses to end-hosts, address-space overhead is created. The overhead increases as the
mutation rate increases. The rate of mutation and flow termination also contributes to the
flow-table overhead.
Spatio-temporal address mutation [58] dynamically changes host IP addresses, adding
a layer of dynamicity to the IP address bindings and host. An overhead is imposed on the
controller for the random mutation computation for each interval. Address space overhead
is created for maintaining sessions during mutation. If the mutation rate is high, the
overhead will be considerable. Queries delivered to the DNS server at shorter intervals also
cause DNS traffic overhead.
Two security functionalities are included in the AVANT-GUARD SDN [59]. First,
from saturation attacks, the control plane is protected by connection migration. The second,
whenever from the traffic, if the attack is detected, flow rules are changed dynamically,
protecting the data plane. The technique requires additional storage for the rules, and the
overhead of assessments is added to the data plane. If the control plane connects with the
data plane via various trigger and payload delivery reports, there may be network overhead.
DFI (Dynamic Flow Isolation) [60] adapts to changing network situation. The situation
includes a time of day and a warning from third-party tools. The systems are subjected to
DFI’s network access policies. On the switches, flow rules are used to govern rate limits,
ingress and egress flows from endpoints. Sensor data is processed using policy decision
points (PDPs), and new flow rules are established in accordance with the present policy.
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Latency is the time delay that happens when the switch sends new flow rules to the
controller and DFI needs to make a decision. This overhead occurs for all new flow rules,
regardless of size. If the new flow rule is present in the system, the latency will be reduced.
4.2.2 Experimental Setup and MTD Application
The topology in this study was developed using the Ryu controller in a Mininet
emulator. The controller’s dynamic algorithm frequently changes the network host
configuration. The southbound interface communicates with hardware devices using the
OpenFlow 1.3 protocol.
The Ryu Controller is in charge of DNS responses, IP address mutation, switch
flow installation. In the terminal session, TCPDump is enabled to capture data packets of
the host. The emulated topology is shown in Figure 4.21. The controller behavior is
demonstrated by capturing and comparing the traffic from both topologies.
The communication steps, as shown in Figure 4.22, are as follows:
Step 1: Host1 sends a DNS request for Host 2 IP address.
Step 2: The controller intercepts the response from the DNS server, and it picks a
random virtual IP address from the pool as v2 from the available IP address
pool and sends it to Host1, establishing a mapping between the real and virtual IP
addresses. The controller delivers the modified DNS response with the virtual IP
address to Host1.
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Figure 4.21 MTD Topology

Figure 4.22 Communication Between Hosts
Step 3: Host1 delivers data packets to the virtual IP address v2 that it has received,
with the source IP being its real IP address r1. Because switch1’s table does not
match the destination IP address, the packets are sent to the controller.
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Step 4: The source and destination IP addresses are checked by the controller. If
the source IP address is valid, it constructs a mapping by selecting a virtual IP
address v1 from the pool at random. The mapping table will be used to check the
destination IP address, and if it is identified, it will check the real IP address host
and install the appropriate flows in the switches that can reach the destination host.
Step 5 & 6: The data packets are sent to Host2 in accordance with the flows.
Because Host2 is directly connected to switch2, the controller will alter the
destination IP to r2 to route packets to Host2 because switch2 is unaware of Host2’s
virtual IP address.
Step 7: When Host2 responds to the data packets, the source IP address becomes
real IP address r2, and the destination IP address becomes v1. The controller
transforms the physical address of r2 to the virtual address of v2.
Step 8 & 9: According to the flows, data packets are delivered to Host1. Because
Host1 is physically linked to switch1, the controller will alter the destination IP to
r1 to route packets to Host1 because switch1 is unaware of Host1’s virtual IP
address.
The real IP addresses are concealed, and the virtual IP addresses are visible to the
outside world. The virtual IP addresses are regularly altered in a dynamic network to
increase the attacker’s cost and complexity when attempting to gather data using host
addresses. Changing the IP addresses frequently increases the overhead in the system,
resulting in packet loss. The controller must install switch flows for every IP address
change, resulting in increased overhead, reaction time delays, and packet loss. Configuring
two topologies allows for network traffic analysis.
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The controller installs flows in the switches depending on the destination host IP
address, which can be real or virtual. Host 1 is attached to Switch 1, and host 2 is attached
to Switch 2. The source IP address is translated to a virtual IP address, and the traffic is
forwarded to the destination virtual host IP address. The MTD implementation algorithm
is shown in Figure 4.23.

Figure 4.23 Algorithm Ryu Controller
To generate traffic, the IPerf command-line utility is utilized. It is one of the most
extensively used methods for assessing network performance. It is used in TCP and UDP
connections to modulate parameters. IPerf should be set up so that one node serves as a
server and the other serves as a client. Requests from the client to the server generate traffic,
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which is also bidirectional. Packet loss, jitter and bandwidth are measured by generating
TCP/UDP traffic.
The traffic is captured using the Command-line interface TCPDump for future
investigation. TCPDump will collect traffic from both MTD-enabled and non-MTD
topologies, saving it as a PCAP file for later examination.
4.2.3 TCP and UDP Traffic Analysis
The TCP UDP traffic captured by TCPDump is analyzed. For each testing session,
TCPDump command line tool captures the traffic and saves as PCAP file. Packet loss, jitter
and bandwidth are examined in this work. Table 4.1 shows test parameters. Using the
analysis MTD network is benchmarked with traditional network.
Table 4.1 Parameters
Parameter (Both Topologies)

Value

Time for Test1 (TCP)

10 Sec

Time for Test2 (TCP)

20 Sec

Time for Test3 (TCP)

30 Sec

Time for Test4 (TCP Bidirectional)

10 Sec

Time for Test5 (UDP)

15 Sec
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Figure 4.24 Test 1 TCP Bandwidth Results

Figure 4.25 Test 2 TCP Bandwidth Results
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Figure 4.26 Test 3 TCP Bandwidth Results

Figure 4.27 Test 4 TCP Bandwidth Bidirectional Traffic Results
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Figure 4.28 Test 5 UDP Bandwidth Results

Figure 4.29 Jitter Measurement
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The data transmitted in a period of time is known as bandwidth. Due to network
disturbances, if the data packets are dropped in a TCP session, the bandwidth will used
more to re-transmit the dropped data. In a TCP session, the receiving endpoint will request
the source to re-transmit the lost data using the sequence numbers. Since the IP address of
the host is changed frequently, the data that is sent to the IP address before mutation will
be dropped if the IP address is changed. The controller has to re-send the data packets
dropped to the IP address after mutation.
The data from source travel in equal intervals to destination in a healthy network.
The time interval between each data packet that is sent to the destination is called Jitter.
The time interval between each packet will be disrupted if there are disturbances in the
network. Jitter causes packet loss by causing congestion.
The bandwidth measurement is shown in Figures 4.24, 4.25, and 4.26, respectively,
based on the aforesaid test findings. In traditional network topology, we can see that the
bandwidth graph is normal. In the MTD network, as time increases, the bandwidth is
decreasing. The mutation of the IP address is causing to termination of the session at the
same time, and the packets are getting dropped. In order to re-transmit the data to a new IP
address, the bandwidth usage is increased, and new data transmission capacity is reduced.
In both topologies, bidirectional traffic is generated, as seen in Figure 4.27. The traffic will
be sent from both endpoints at the same time, and the bandwidths are measured for both
sender and receiver. At the beginning and end of the test, the MTD architecture has
somewhat less bandwidth than the traditional network.
The bandwidth analysis of the UDP session is shown in Figure 4.28. The data is
transmitted normally in a traditional network without any packet loss, however, the MTD
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topology bandwidth increased significantly at first and then decreased abruptly before
returning to normal. The bandwidth usage is normal because UDP does not re-transmit the
lost data packets.
The jitter analysis of UDP session traffic is shown in Figure 4.29. In typical network
topology, jitter is expected. In a typical network, the time distribution between packets
arriving at their destination is normal. If the jitter time interval fluctuates in a session,
congestion occurs, resulting in packet loss. The IP mutation in the MTD network causes
the controller to be burdened with the task of installing numerous flows in the switches in
a short period of time. The network becomes unbalanced as a result of the configuration
modifications, leading to congestion, packet loss, and other issues. Table 4.2 shows the
resulting overheads created and Table 4.3 shows the packet loss.

Table 4.2 Overheads

Overhead
Address-space

Flow-table size

Routing-update
Execution

Description
This overhead is created due to the frequent assignment of
virtual IP addresses to the hosts. The controller requires
additional space to map the sessions with IP addresses.
As the IP addresses of the nodes are changed frequently, the
number of flows in the table increases if the existing flows are
not managed to delete on time.
As the new flow is added to the flow table, the updates should
be sent to network devices.
The application running on the controller changes the IP
address of the host frequently, resulting in execution
overhead.
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Table 4.3 Packet Loss
Test
1, 2, 3
4
5
5

Protocol
TCP
TCP
UDP
UDP

Topology
Both
Both
Traditional
MTD

Packet Loss
None
None
None
22%

4.3 Discrete Host Address Mutation and Analysis in SDN
In this research, we propose host address mutation [62] deployed as a novel MTD
technique in the SDN environment, which aims to create high uncertainty in adversary
scanning by changing the IP addresses of the host in the network based on individual
mutation time intervals. The main objectives of this research are discussed in sequence.
First, transparency is maintained in the mutation of the IP address of each host in the
network. To provide transparency, the real IP (rIP) address of each host is unchanged, and
a short-lived random virtual IP (vIP) address is assigned regularly to each real IP according
to the mutation time interval.
Second, Once the session (Stcp , Sudp , Sicmp) is established, the hosts are ready to
transfer and receive the data from each other. The active session (Act(hi , hk)) mapping is
created for each host, and it is monitored. Since the session time interval varies for each
host, the mutation time interval also varies. Sometimes the session interval is long that
adversaries can be successful in implementing a scanning attack. Even though the
adversaries obtain the host’s information, it is a virtual IP that will be changing rapidly. In
this way, the mutation interval is different for every host, which does not need to change
the address while in active session, preserving network performance and stability.
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Third, we assume that every host in the network will not be given privileges to
access sensitive data, modify network configuration, change firewall settings, and simply
not even BIOS settings of the host itself in an enterprise network topology. In this situation,
the hosts with administrative privileges are targeted more than the others. The scanning
attacks on those specific host IP addresses will be high when compared to other host IP
addresses. The host active in transferring and receiving data is targeted more than the host,
which is less active; this attribute can also be added because the attackers are more likely
to collect more useful data within a short period.
Fourth, to provide enough IP addresses to hosts in the network, the unused public
address space range should be equivalent to the number of mutations in a host time interval.
In a network, there will be hosts that can be reached publicly and need a public address
range, and some hosts are internal to the network, which can be provided with a private
address space range. The private address space range is always huge than the public address
space. This mutation scheme using data stats is also effective when the available address
space is less. Due to insufficient address space, some of the hosts cannot be moved, or the
host address is repeated multiple times in a short interval of time. To avoid this problem,
data stats are used to allocate the address space range for a host involved actively in the
network and targeted by the attackers frequently.
To implement these techniques, traditional network implementation is costly and
poses more challenges. We use software-defined Networking (SDN) infrastructure, which
is quite flexible in developing and managing the network with minimal operational
overhead. The network controller RYU is used to monitor and control the network using
the OpenFlow 1.3 protocol. The network topology is built using Mininet. The experimental
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results and analysis of the simulated network will show the significant rise in defending
the network against reconnaissance attacks by increasing uncertainty in scanning,
complexity in gathering the information about the network systems.
4.3.1 Proposed Methodology
In this moving target defense host address the mutation scheme. Consider a
network topology with Ns number of hosts. Here we created the topology in Mininet, and
the RYU controller is used. The controller implements the data flow between the network
components. Figure 4.30 shows the topology with two hosts, and later we add two hosts.
Ns = {h1, h2, h3, h4 . . . . . . . . . hn}

(4.1)

The real Ip address (rIP) of each host in the network is replaced by a short-lived
virtual IP address (vIP). The virtual IP addresses are assigned randomly from the pool of
available unused address space. The mapping function fmap is used to assign a virtual IP
address to a real IP address.
vIP = fmap(rIP)

Figure 4.30 Network Topology with Two Hosts
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(4.2)

When the host hi initiates communication with host hj, a DNS request will be sent
to the server to resolve the domain name into the vIP address of the host hj and a session
(Stcp , Sudp , Sicmp) will be established between host hi and hj by installing the flows in the
required switches and active session mapping Act(hi, hj) is created for monitoring the data
stats. The controller will monitor the data stats for each session. Data stats include
parameters like session interval, source IP, destination IP, source MAC, destination MAC,
data packets sent, and received in that time interval, etc. Once the session is ended, it is
removed from the active session table. If the host wants to communicate and establish a
session again, the DNS request should be sent to the server to retrieve the vIP address of
the host.
Since each session time interval (St) depends on the length of time taken by the
hosts to complete the transfer of data between each other, the randomization is applied
when the session is ended to provide network performance and stability. The mutation time
interval Mt is the session time interval. If the mutation time interval is random, the session
between the hosts will be interrupted, and the packets are dropped.
St = S(tcp, udp, icmp)(Act(hi, hj))
Mt = St

(4.3)
(4.4)

If the address space in network topology is Ns. The available active hosts in the
network are Na. The time taken for reconnaissance attack for each active host is Tr,h. The
total average time Ta, r that the adversary will spend on reconnaissance attack on all hosts
will be:
Ta, r = Na x Tr, h
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(4.5)

If Cr, h is the cost to spend for reconnaissance attack on a single host. The total cost
Ca, r that the adversary needs to spend on reconnaissance on all active hosts will be:
Ca, r = Na x Cr, h

(4.6)

Fingerprinting is a technique used by the adversary to find the vulnerable host with
high probability in the network by analyzing the data collected from the reconnaissance.
Similar fingerprint operations will not be repeated on the host if it fails to find. The
probability of identifying the vulnerable host in the network successfully with i steps will
be:
Pi = 1 / Na , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ Na

(4.7)

If Tf, a is the fingerprint time spent on the single host, then the average time taken
by the adversary for reconnaissance and fingerprinting analyses to find the vulnerable host
is defined as:
Tf = Ns x Ta, r + ((Na + 1) x Tf, a) / 2

(4.8)

From the above analysis if Tm is the mutation time interval, then:
Tm ≤ (Ns x Tr, h + Tf, a)

(4.9)

From the above analysis, for each Tm interval, the adversary cannot complete a
reconnaissance attack. The adversaries will target the host, which is very active in
transferring and receiving data. The adversaries tend to collect a large amount of traffic
within a small time. The amount of available unused address space should be equivalent to
the number of hosts in the network topology. If the address space in network topology is
Ns and the available unused address space is Nu, s then:
Nu, s ≡ Ns
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(4.10)

If the available unused address space is less, then some of the hosts in the network
cannot be moved or cannot be moved frequently according to the mutation time interval.
To solve this problem, the hosts which are highly active in the network are identified. The
adversaries try to gather the maximum amount of data within less time, which is possible
when the host is highly active and can be targeted. The scanning attack stats and data
packets stats can be monitored using SNORT, and it will alert the controller according to
the rules written into it. Using SNORT rules, we can analyze the data packets and discover
the hosts which are highly active in the network and targeted by the adversaries. In this
way, the unused IP addresses can be used effectively. Ryu and SNORT can be configured
on a single machine or different machines.
4.3.2 Architecture
The topology is implemented in the Mininet network using the Ryu controller. The
topology can be seen in Fig. 2 in detail. Ryu controller acts as intermediate central software
to manage network activities like IP mutations, DNS responses, Session establishment, IP
address space management, Data stats analysis using SNORT.
Table 4.4 Notations
Ns

Network address space

Na

Active hosts in the network

rIP

Real IP address

vIP

Short-lived virtual IP address

fmap

Real IP to virtual IP mapping function

Stcp

TCP session between hosts

Sudp

UDP session between hosts

Sicmp

ICMP session between hosts

Act(hi, hj)

Active session mapping between host hi and host hj
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Table 4.4 Notations (continued)
St
Mt
Tr,h
Ta, r
Cr, h
Ca, r
Pi
Tf, a
Tf
Nu, s
SNORT

Session time interval
Mutation time interval
Time taken for reconnaissance attack on
each active host in the network
Total average time spent on reconnaissance
attack on all active hosts in the network
Cost to implement reconnaissance attack
on a single host
The total cost of implementing
reconnaissance attack on all active hosts
The probability of identifying vulnerable
host in the network
Time spent for fingerprinting on a single
host
Average fingerprinting time spent on all
hosts in the network
Available unused address space
Data packet sniffer, IDS, IPS

The unmatched packets in the OpenFlow switches will be encapsulated and sent to
the Ryu controller. The controller discovers the type of packets, and required actions are
taken. If the packet is DNS request to resolve the host, then the controller will follow series
of steps to authenticate the host and install the necessary flows in necessary OpenFlow
switches to establish the session between the hosts. The active session will be mapped into
the table Act(hi, hj) to track the number of active sessions in the network. The mutation
interval is discrete for each host, and the session will be terminated when the hosts stop
communicating with each other. Every time the hosts need to communicate, the name
should be resolved and establish a session. SNORT will monitor all the data packets and
alert the controller if anomalies are detected according to the rules. SNORT will collect
data stats about each host, which can be used to discover highly active hosts in the network.
This data can also be used when the unused address space is limited.
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4.3.3 Traffic Generation and Reconnaissance
To generate the traffic between the hosts, IPerf tool is used, and using the
TCPDump command-line tool, and traffic is captured and saved into a PCAP file for further
analysis. The PCAP file is analyzed using Snort IDS. The scanning attack on the network
is made using Nmap from Kali Linux OS, as shown in Figure 4.31. SNORT details the
number of TCP and UDP sessions between the hosts, events that needed to be reviewed,
etc.
Using the SNORT statistics, the scanned IP addresses can be known and the number
of times each IP is scanned. Using Nmap scanning, the attacker can gather whether the host
is up or down, open ports available, services running on the open ports and their versions
etc. Even though the attacker gathers all the details, the IP address will be changed
frequently, creating complex situations to understand the network.

Figure 4.31 Reconnaissance Using Kali
Using security onion as shown in Figure 4.31, further analysis can be done on the
PCAP file. If the adversary succeeds reconnaissance stage and try to infect the PC, as a
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security analyst, detailed packet analysis should be done. The following Figure 4.32
shows the series of steps involved in the analysis.

Figure 4.32 SGUIL for Packet Analysis
4.3.4 Results and Analysis

Figure 4.33 Nmap Scan for Live Hosts
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From Figure 4.33, you can see that the adversary can find the active host and
identify the open ports available by using stealth scan. Figure 4.34 shows the services
running on the open ports and its versions. In Figure 4.35, SNORT collects the individual
host’s total sessions for a certain period for further analysis.

Figure 4.34 Nmap Results

Figure 4.35 SNORT Session Results
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Figure 4.36 SNORT Alerts
Figure 4.36 shows the alerts generated by SNORT IDS. The attacker scanned the
network for possible information leak, which includes a username overflow attempt
classified under attempted administrator privilege gain. The alerts generated by SNORT
shows the number of hosts scanned and the information gathered. The mutation technique
thwarts the scanning by changing the IP address of the host. The attacker cannot know
the details of which host the information is gathered. Some other types of events filtered
by SNORT are shown below in Table 4.5 and only few are listed.
Table 4.5 Snort Filtered Events
Events filtered by SNORT
DNS named version attempt
RSERVICES rexec username overflow attempt
SCAN nmap XMAS
POLICY FTP anonymous login attempt
FTP PORT bounce attempt
CHAT IRC nick change
SNMP request tcp
SNMP AgentX/tcp request
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Figure 4.37 Hosts Mutations at the Same Time

Figure 4.38 Hosts Sessions
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Figure 4.39 individualized Hosts Mutations
The number of mutations of all hosts for a certain period is shown in Figure 4.37.
Since the mutation time interval is random for all hosts, the host addresses are changed at
the same time for all hosts. If a host is in a TCP/UDP session with other host or server, it
will be interrupted due to random mutation. This will create instability in the network, and
the network performance will be degraded. Figure 4.38 shows the number of sessions
established by each host. The session establishment number of each host varies with one
another. Figure 4.39 shows the number of mutations of each host after the application of a
discrete mutation interval. The mutation technique is applied when the host terminates the
session without interrupting. The stability of the network can be preserved with this
technique. The host, which is active in the network, established more sessions than the
other hosts. By analyzing this data, the address space range for each host can be assigned.
The host which is active is assigned more address space range than other hosts which are
less active. In this way, when the availability of host addresses is less, it can be managed
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with this technique. When the address space range is less, the same IP address is assigned
to the host multiple times in a short interval. This gives the adversary to gather more
information with the same IP address.

4.4 Discrete Host Address Mutation with Subnet Game Strategy and Benchmarking
Discrete Host Address Mutation is introduced in section 4.3. In this chapter, subnet
game strategy has been included in our discrete MTD algorithm to improve the complexity
in understanding the network structure by the attacker.
4.4.1 Subnet Game Strategy
The private IP addresses in a network are not routed on the internet. They are used
within the local network. The range of private IP addresses in each class is shown in
Figure 4.40.

Figure 4.40 Private IP Addresses
Consider a network topology as shown in Figure 4.41. The network subnets are
ranging from 192.168.1.0/24 to 192.168.7.0/24. In each subnet, you have more than 200
unused IP addresses are left. We can use the unused IP addresses and assign them to the
hosts as virtual IP addresses by creating multiple IP address pools. Each pool is a different
subnet, as shown in the Figure 4.41.
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Figure 4.41 Example Subnet Topology

Figure 4.42 Subnet Pools
The virtual IP addresses are selected randomly from each different subnet pool, as
shown in Figure 4.42. Implementing this technique increases complexity in understanding
the network topology by the attacker. For example, if the initial IP address of the host is
192.168.2.3 and after mutation interval, let us assume the IP address changes to
192.168.4.6. The attacker will get confused to determine the host’s subnet and network
topology diagram.
4.4.2 Benchmarking and Analysis
4.4.2.1 Benchmarking Topology
This section introduces benchmarking [61] analysis to measure SDN controller
network stability in terms of performance, scalability, and reliability. The popular LeafSpine network topology is adopted and emulated in Mininet. IPerf traffic generators TP1
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and TP2 are initiated at required nodes to generate the network traffic. The Leaf-Spine
topology and parameters are shown below in Figure 4.43 and Table 4.6. We used
Wireshark to capture the network traffic data and do further analysis. We increased the
number of switches and hosts from topology 1 to topology 5. Adding more resources to
the network topology increases the load on the controller. As the load is increased from T1
to T5, we measured the network’s stability and the controller’s performance. The
benchmarking analysis is performed on random host address mutation technique and
discrete host address mutation technique against traditional software-defined networking,
and results are shown. We can observe from the results that the proposed MTD network
outperformed the random MTD network. Each test in the topology is repeated for 10 times,
and the average value is recorded.

Figure 4.43 Leaf-Spine Topology
Table 4.6 Topologies
Topologies
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5

OVS Switches
16
32
48
64
80
72

Nodes
200
400
600
800
1000

Figure 4.44 Leaf-Spine Topology with Controller
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4.4.2.2 Benchmarking Performance
Benchmarking Performance contain the following tests:
1. Network Topology Discovery Time
2. Asynchronous Message Processing Time
3. Asynchronous Message Processing Rate
4. Reactive Path Provisioning Time
5. Proactive Path Provisioning Time
6. Reactive Path Provisioning Rate
7. Proactive Path Provisioning Rate
8. Network Topology Change Detection Time
4.4.2.2.1 Network Topology Discovery Time
The time taken to discover the network devices and determine the complete
topology of the network. Link layer discovery protocol is used to determine the discovery
time, as shown in Figure 4.45.
Tm1 is the timestamp of the initial discovery message sent by the controller.
Tmn is the final discovery message sent by the controller.
The time for the last discovery message = Tmn
Topology Discovery Time (DT1) = Tmn - Tm1
The average of the topology discovery time is as follows:
(TDm) =

𝐷𝑇1 + 𝐷𝑇2 + 𝐷𝑇3 .. 𝐷𝑇𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
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Figure 4.45 Network Topology Discovery Time

Figure 4.46 Network Topology Discovery Time Benchmark
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The network topology discovery time is measured for both random and discrete
MTD techniques enabled networks against the traditional network. The Figure 4.46 shows
that the traditional network took less time to discover the topology, and the random MTD
network took greater time to discover the topology. The discrete MTD network discovery
time is closer to the traditional network, as shown in Figure 4.46.

4.4.2.2.2 Asynchronous Message Processing Time
The network devices in the southbound interface often generate notifications for
the controller. The total time taken by the controller to process the event is measured as
shown in Figure 4.47. The process is repeated for ten trials, and the average value is
recorded in each topology. The results for each network type are recorded.

Asynchronous Message Processing Time (APT1) =
𝑆𝑈𝑀{𝑅𝑖} − 𝑆𝑈𝑀{𝑇𝑖}
𝑁𝑟𝑥
T1 is the event transmission timestamp, and R1 is the response received timestamp.
Nrx is the total number of messages exchanged successfully.

Average Asynchronous Message Processing Time =
𝐴𝑃𝑇1 + 𝐴𝑃𝑇2 + 𝐴𝑃𝑇3 . . 𝐴𝑃𝑇𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
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Figure 4.47 Asynchronous Message Processing Time

Figure 4.48 Asynchronous Message Processing Time Benchmark
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Figure 4.48 shows the time taken to process the message by the controller in each
network. The traditional network took a very short time to process, and the random MTD
network took a long time when compared to traditional and Discrete MTD networks. The
discrete MTD network performed better than the Random MTD network, and it is
somewhat closer to the traditional network performance.
4.4.2.2.3 Asynchronous Message Processing Rate
The total number of event messages processed by the controller per second.

Figure 4.49 Asynchronous Message Processing Rate
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It is measured by sending the messages from network devices to the controller for a
short time and calculate the number of messages successfully processed by the controller
and received by the network devices.
Nrxn is the number of successful messages received from the controller, as shown in
Figure 4.49.
Asynchronous Message Processing Rate (APRn) =

𝑁𝑟𝑥𝑛
𝑇𝑑

Figure 4.50 Asynchronous Message Processing Rate Benchmark
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Figure 4.50 shows the number of messages processed by each network at different
topologies. The random MTD network performed worse when compared to others. The
discrete MTD network performed well, and its results are closer to the traditional network.
4.4.2.2.4 Reactive Path Provisioning Time
The amount of time taken by the controller to create a reactive path between source
and destination nodes is measured. It is critical to track how quickly the controller creates
an end-to-end data plane flow. The time period begins with the controller(s) receiving the
initial flow provisioning request message and ends with the controller(s) sending the last
flow provisioning response message at its southbound interface, as shown in Figure 4.51.
Tsf1 is the timestamp of the provisioning request received by the controller.
Tdf1 is the timestamp of the provisioning response received from the controller.
Reactive Path Provisioning Time (RPT1) = Tdf1 - Tsf1
Average Reactive Path Provisioning Time =

𝑅𝑃𝑇1 + 𝑅𝑃𝑇2 + 𝑅𝑃𝑇3 . . 𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
Figure 4.52 shows the provisioning time taken by all the networks. As the topology
load increases, the time taken by the random MTD network is increased at a higher rate.
On the other hand, the discrete MTD network performed well, and it is closer to the
traditional network.
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Figure 4.51 Reactive Path Provisioning Time

Figure 4.52 Reactive Path Provisioning Time Benchmark
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4.4.2.2.5 Reactive Path Provisioning Rate
The maximum number of independent pathways between source and destination
nodes that a controller can establish in a single second. The controller’s ability to set up
as many end-to-end flows in the data plane must be measured. If TP1 is the traffic generator
and TP2 is the receiver, then the total number of frames received by the TP2 in a time
interval as shown in Figure 4.53.

Figure 4.53 Reactive Path Provisioning Rate
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Reactive Path Provisioning Rate (RPR1) =

𝑁𝑑𝑓
𝑇𝑑

Ndf is the total number of successful traffic frames received at the destination.
Trial Duration (Td)

Average Reactive Path Provisioning Rate =

𝑅𝑃𝑇1 + 𝑅𝑃𝑇2 + 𝑅𝑃𝑇3 .. 𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠

Figure 4.54 Reactive Path Provisioning Rate Benchmark
Figure 4.54 shows the number of unique frames received or the number of paths
established per second between the hosts. The random MTD network underperformed as
the topology weight is increased. The discrete MTD network performed better, and it is
closer to the traditional network.
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4.4.2.2.6 Proactive Path Provisioning Time
The time it takes the controller to create a path between the source and destination
nodes proactively. It is similar to reactive path provisioning except that the flow is added
manually, making it proactive. Here we measure the time taken to provision the proactive
path between the hosts, as shown in Figure 4.55.
Tsf1 is the timestamp of the provisioning request received by the controller.
Tdf1 is the timestamp of the provisioning response received from the controller.
Proactive Flow Provisioning Time (PPT1) = Tdf1 - Tsf1
Average Proactive Path Provisioning Time =

𝑃𝑃𝑇1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑇2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑇3 .. 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠

Figure 4.55 Proactive Path Provisioning Time
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Figure 4.56 Proactive Path Provisioning Time Benchmark
Figure 4.56 shows the time taken by the discrete MTD network is better when
compared to a random MTD network. As the topology weight increases, the time taken to
provision the path increase very high in a random MTD network, and the discrete MTD
network is somewhat closer to the traditional network.

4.4.2.2.7 Proactive Path Provisioning Rate
The maximum number of independent pathways between source and destination nodes
that a controller can establish in a single second is shown in Figure 4.57.
Proactive Path Provisioning Rate (PPR1) =
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𝑁𝑑𝑓
𝑇𝑑

Figure 4.57 Proactive Path Provisioning Rate
Ndf is the total number of successful traffic frames received at the destination.
Trial Duration (Td)
Average Proactive Path Provisioning Rate =

𝑃𝑃𝑅1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑅2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑅3 . . 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
Figure 4.58 shows the random MTD network underperformed in the proactive provisioning
rate. The discrete MTD network performed fairly and is closer to the traditional network.
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Figure 4.58 Proactive Path Provisioning Rate Benchmark

4.4.2.2.8 Network Topology Change Detection Time
The time it takes for the controller to notice changes in the network topology. It is vital
to test how quickly the controller can identify any network-state change events to provide
fast network failure recovery.
Tcn is the time when the controller receives the first topology change notification.
Tcd is the time when the controller sends the initial topology rediscovery message.
Network Topology Change Detection Time (TDT1) = Tcd - Tcn
Average Network Topology Change Detection Time =

𝑇𝐷𝑇1 + 𝑇𝐷𝑇2 + 𝑇𝐷𝑇3 . . 𝑇𝐷𝑇𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠
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Figure 4.59 Network Topology Change Detection Time Benchmark
Figure 4.59 shows the discrete MTD network performed better than the random
MTD network. The controller does not have additional operational cost in the traditional
network to frequently mutate the host’s IP address since the network is static. The random
MTD network has more operational cost than the discrete MTD network, reducing the
controller processing speed.
4.4.2.3 Benchmarking Scalability
4.4.2.3.1 Control Sessions Capacity
At a given time, the number of control sessions that the controller can monitor
simultaneously. Control Sessions Capacity must be measured to determine the controller’s
system and bandwidth resource requirements. The control session capacity is measured by
increasing the number of switches in the network and record the number of hello exchange
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messages between the controller and the switch. If the hello messages exchanged become
constant even though the switches are added to the topology, then that number is the
capacity of the controller to handle those many switches simultaneously. The following
Figure 4.60 shows control sessions capacity measurement.

Figure 4.60 Control Sessions Capacity

Figure 4.61 Control Sessions Capacity Benchmark
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The Figure 4.61 shows the control sessions capacity of the controller. We have
added T6 and T7 topology with high number of switches to find the session capacity of the
controller. We can observe that the random MTD network underperformed, and it can
handle the switches of less than a hundred simultaneously. The traditional network can
handle up to five hundred switches, and the discrete MTD network performed well and the
results are close to the traditional network.
4.4.2.3.2 Forwarding Table Capacity
The capacity of the forwarding table in the controller. It is critical to determine the
number of flows the controller can handle and forward traffic without dropping.

Figure 4.62 Forwarding Table Capacity
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It is measured by sending traffic from multiple hosts to multiple destinations. When
the controller receives the traffic, it will create an entry into the forwarding table for the
traffic flow. The traffic is sent to the multiple destinations until the query to the forwarding
table returns the same for 3 to 5 times as shown in the Figure 4.62.

Figure 4.63 Forwarding Table Capacity Benchmark
From the Figure 4.63, the flow table capacity of traditional network and discrete
MTD network is increased as the topology weight is increased. The random MTD network
handles less flows when compared to others.
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4.4.2.4 Benchmarking Reliability
4.4.2.4.1 Controller Failover Time
When the controllers are in redundancy mode, and one of the active controllers
fails, the time it takes to transition from the active controller to the backup controller. The
time period begins when the active controller is turned off and ends when the new
controller’s southbound interface receives the first rediscovery message. When two
controllers are paired together, and one of them fails, this benchmark assesses the impact
of provisioning new flows. The Controller Failover Time is calculated as the difference
between the final valid frame received before the traffic loss and the first valid frame
received after the traffic loss.

Figure 4.64 Controller Failover Time Benchmark
Figure 4.64 shows the controller failover time. The time taken by the backup
controller to become active in a traditional network is very small when compared to the
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random and discrete MTD networks. The traditional network is static, and there is no IP
address mutation. On the other hand, random and discrete MTD networks continuously
change the IP address of the host. In dynamic networks, the controller has to synchronize
data with the backup controller to avoid data loss. Data Synchronization is a limitation in
this research and synchronizing the data across the controllers is a costly operation and is
considered future work. Since the dynamic networks change the IP addresses frequently,
when the controller failed, it took more time to become active for the backup controller.
However, the discrete MTD network performed better than the random MTD network.
4.4.2.4.2 Network Re-provisioning Time
When existing traffic paths fail, the time it takes for the controller to reroute traffic.

Figure 4.65 Network Re-provisioning Time Benchmark
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To measure network re-provisioning time, record the timestamp of the last frame
received by the host before the loss of traffic and the timestamp recorded when the host
receives the first frame after the loss of traffic. The difference of these two timestamps
gives the time required to re-provision the network.
In Figure 4.65, the time taken by the traditional network controller is less when
compared to dynamic networks. The discrete MTD network performed better than the
random MTD network, and it is close to the traditional network performance.

Figure 4.66 Packet Loss
Figure 4.66 shows the packet loss in each topology T1 to T5. As the topology
weight is increasing on the network, the controller’s load will also increase to process high
amount of data. In a random MTD network, since all host IP addresses are changed
simultaneously, the session termination is made, and data packets are lost in the
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transmission. The re-transmission of lost data packets occupies the network bandwidth,
resulting in slower processing of new data by the controller, and also packet loss is high.
The discrete MTD network has lower amounts of packet loss due to the individualization
of mutation intervals. The sessions are not interrupted in the network; as a result, the packet
loss is less and closer to the traditional network.
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CHAPTER V – CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter summarizes the contributions of this research, and the future works
are illustrated at the end. We have introduced four studies related to moving target defense
techniques application and analysis. In the first study, MTD technique is implemented on
drone’s wireless network. We observed that the latency in the network is increasing as the
number of mutations increase. To observe the network performance after the application
of MTD technique, we have implemented random host address mutation technique in
software-defined networking and network performance is analyzed. We observed that the
MTD algorithms is creating disturbances in the network that we have discussed. In the third
study, we have proposed a new discrete MTD technique to improve network performance
and reduce the disturbances in the network. In the fourth study, we have added a game
strategy improve the security of the network and the discrete MTD technique, random
MTD techniques are benchmarked against the traditional network.
In the first study, a MAC address dynamic mutation technique is developed and
implemented on the drone wireless network, including intrusion detection system and
enhanced security with wireless network encryption. The MAC address of the drone is used
to launch a cyber-attack. In the reconnaissance stage of the cyber kill chain, the hacker
collects the configuration of the drone network. Once the information is gathered, the
hacker does not need to re-scan since the wireless network of the drone is static. We
developed an MTD technique to change the static MAC address of the drone frequently.
Since the MAC address is changing from time to time, the attacker will be unsuccessful in
launching an attack on the network using the network configuration information collected
previously.
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In the second study, A random host address mutation technique is developed in
software-defined networking, and network analysis is shown. The mutation of the host IP
addresses of all hosts is implemented at a random time in the network. The IP address
mutation is a widely researched technique, and it provides network security by assigning a
virtual IP address to the host at a time interval. Thus, the mutation technique not only
provides security to the network but also creates an overhead for changing the host’s
configuration by the SDN controller. We implemented the random host address mutation
technique, and the performance of the network is shown by benchmarking against the
traditional network.
The third study, we proposed a novel discrete host address mutation technique in
software-defined networking to individualize the mutation interval of each host in the
network. In random host address mutation, the IP addresses of all hosts are changed at the
same interval, terminating the established session between the hosts deteriorating the
network stability. To overcome this backlog, a discrete host address mutation is developed
to individualize the mutation interval of each host. However, individualizing the mutation
interval of each host makes it complex for the attacker to understand the mutation interval.
The mutation interval of each host is based on the flow statistics of the host monitored by
the controller. The controller changes the IP address of the host when there is no exchange
of data.
In fourth study we added an IP subnet game strategy to our MTD technique to
enhance the security and we benchmarked the discrete and random MTD networks against
the traditional network. The virtual IP addresses are selected randomly from the pool of
different IP subnets to make it complex for the attacker to understand the network topology.
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A benchmarking framework is developed to measure the stability of the network in terms
of performance, scalability, and reliability.
The random host address mutation has limitations such as the mutation of host IP
address is implemented at random time. If the host is in a session of exchanging data with
other hosts, it is forced to terminate the session and change the IP address resulting in
packet loss and additional overhead on the controller to transmit the lost data packets. The
operational cost on the controller increases as the topology weight is increased on the
network resulting in underperformance of the network controller. We have proposed a
discrete moving target defense technique that individualize each host’s mutation interval
to solve the above problem. The mutation interval of each host on the network is based on
its flow stats. We used SDN controller Ryu northbound Rest API service to collect the flow
stats of each host for each time interval. When the host is not exchanging any data, the IP
address is changed. In this way, the packet loss is reduced in the network and also
operational cost on the controller.
Finally, the IP subnet strategy is developed to increase in complexity for the
attacker to understand the network topology. In the reconnaissance phase, the attacker
scans the network using multiple stealth mode tools to gather the network’s data and create
a network topology diagram. When the host’s IP address is assigned a virtual IP address
from the pool of different subnets each time, the attacker finds it complex to create a
network topology diagram. The benchmarking framework is developed to measure the
stability of the network in terms of performance, scalability, and reliability. The discrete
MTD network outperformed in all tests compared to random MTD network showing that
discrete host address mutation is a better technique to apply on the network for security
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and stability. The drawback found in benchmarking is that the controller's failover time.
When the controller fails, the backup controller should become active and take over the
network control. Since the IP address mutation is implemented, there is a need for the
controller to synchronize the data, and further discussed in future works.
Future Works. In the conclusion of this research, we highlighted a critical topic
for future work on controller failover time. Since the static network does not need to change
the IP address of each, the failover time is very small, and the IP addresses remain the
same. In the case of a dynamic network, the controller has to change the IP address of each
host after a time interval. When the controller fails, the tracking data of each host’s current
virtual IP address will be lost. There will be a data loss before the new controller takes
over. Even though the new controller takes over, there is no data synchronized from the
failed controller to the backup controller, so that the hosts need to establish new sessions
to transmit the data. Synchronizing controller data will create a high operational cost, and
if only the important data is synchronized, the cost can be reduced. So that future work
will be focused on backup controller synchronization, and reduction of controller fail over
time for better stability of the network. The future work also includes exploring other
categories of MTD techniques and further improving the performance of discrete MTD
networks.

99

REFERENCES
[1] “CSD-MTD,” Department of Homeland Security, 21-Sep-2018. [Online]. Available:
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/csd-mtd. [Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].
[2] Ward, Bryan C., Steven R. Gomez, Richard Skowyra, David Bigelow, Jason Martin,
James Landry, and Hamed Okhravi. “Survey of Cyber Moving Targets Second
Edition.” (2018).
[3] “Software-Defined Networking (SDN) Definition,” Open Networking Foundation,
03-Jun-2020. [Online]. Available: https://opennetworking.org/sdn-definition/.
[Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].
[4] “List of SDN controller software,” Wikipedia, 06-Apr-2021. [Online]. Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_SDN_controller_software. [Accessed: 20Jun-2021].
[5] Gudla, Charan, Md Shohel Rana, and Andrew H. Sung. "Defense techniques against
cyber attacks on unmanned aerial vehicles." Proceedings of the International
Conference on Embedded Systems, Cyber-physical Systems, and Applications
(ESCS). The Steering Committee of The World Congress in Computer Science,
Computer Engineering and Applied Computing (WorldComp), 2018, pp. 110-116.
[6] Gudla, C. and Sung, A.H., 2020, November. Moving Target Defense Application and
Analysis in Software-Defined Networking. In 2020 11th IEEE Annual Information
Technology, Electronics and Mobile Communication Conference (IEMCON) (pp.
0641-0646). IEEE.
[7] C. Gudla and A. H. Sung, " Moving Target Defense Discrete Host Address Mutation
and Analysis in SDN," 2020 International Conference on Computational Science
and Computational Intelligence (CSCI), 2020. IEEE, pp. 55-61.
[8] S. I. S. A.- P. S. Specialists, “Reconnaissance – the Eagle's Eye of Cyber Security SISA Blog,” SISA Information Security, 15-May-2020. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sisainfosec.com/blogs/reconnaissance-the-eagles-eye-of-cybersecurity/. [Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].
[9] Yuan Shi, Huanguo Zhang, Juan Wang, Feng Xiao, Jianwei Huang, Daochen Zha,
Hongxin Hu, Fei Yan, Bo Zhao, "CHAOS: An SDN-Based Moving Target Defense
System", Security and Communication Networks, vol. 2017, Article ID 3659167,
11 pages, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/3659167.
100

[10] W. Xia, Y. Wen, C. H. Foh, D. Niyato and H. Xie, "A Survey on Software-Defined
Networking," in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 2751, Firstquarter 2015, doi: 10.1109/COMST.2014.2330903.
[11] D. Kreutz, F. M. V. Ramos, P. E. Veríssimo, C. E. Rothenberg, S. Azodolmolky and
S. Uhlig, "Software-Defined Networking: A Comprehensive Survey," in
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 103, no. 1, pp. 14-76, Jan. 2015, doi:
10.1109/JPROC.2014.2371999.
[12] Braun W, Menth M. Software-Defined Networking Using OpenFlow: Protocols,
Applications and Architectural Design Choices. Future Internet. 2014; 6(2):302336. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi6020302.
[13] K. Bakshi, "Considerations for Software Defined Networking (SDN): Approaches
and use cases," 2013 IEEE Aerospace Conference, 2013, pp. 1-9, doi:
10.1109/AERO.2013.6496914.
[14] V. Pashkov, A. Shalimov and R. Smeliansky, "Controller failover for SDN enterprise
networks," 2014 International Science and Technology Conference (Modern
Networking
Technologies)
(MoNeTeC),
2014,
pp.
1-6,
doi:
10.1109/MoNeTeC.2014.6995594.
[15] Berde, P., Snow, W., Parulkar, G., Gerola, M., Hart, J., Higuchi, Y., Radoslavov, P.
(2014). ONOS. Proceedings of the Third Workshop on Hot Topics in Software
Defined Networking - HotSDN ’14. doi:10.1145/2620728.2620744.
[16] Goransson, P., Black, C., & Culver, T. (2016). Software defined networks: a
comprehensive approach. Morgan Kaufmann.
[17] Ryu SDN Framework—Open-source SDN Platform Software | NTT Technical
Review. (n.d.). NTT. Retrieved June 20, 2021, from https://www.nttreview.jp/archive/ntttechnical.php?contents=ntr201408fa4.html.
[18] S. Asadollahi, B. Goswami and M. Sameer, "Ryu controller's scalability experiment
on software defined networks," 2018 IEEE International Conference on Current
Trends in Advanced Computing (ICCTAC), 2018, pp. 1-5, doi:
10.1109/ICCTAC.2018.8370397.
[19] Contributors, M. P. (n.d.). Mininet: An Instant Virtual Network on Your Laptop (or
Other PC) - Mininet. Mininet.Org. Retrieved June 20, 2021, from
http://mininet.org/.

101

[20] R. L. S. de Oliveira, C. M. Schweitzer, A. A. Shinoda and Ligia Rodrigues Prete,
"Using Mininet for emulation and prototyping Software-Defined Networks," 2014
IEEE Colombian Conference on Communications and Computing (COLCOM),
2014, pp. 1-6, doi: 10.1109/ColComCon.2014.6860404.
[21] Jajodia, S., Ghosh, A. K., Swarup, V., Wang, C., & Wang, X. S. (Eds.).
(2011). Moving target defense: creating asymmetric uncertainty for cyber
threats (Vol. 54). Springer Science & Business Media.
[22] Lichtman, A., & Nair, M. (2015). Humanitarian uses of drones and satellite imagery
analysis: the promises and perils. AMA journal of ethics, 17(10), pp. 931-937.
[23] Udeanu, Gheorghe, et al. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Military Operations.”
Scientific Research and Education in the Air Force, vol. 18, no. 1, 2016, pp. 199206., doi:10.19062/2247-3173.2016.18.1.26.
[24] Kafi, Mohamed Amine, et al. “A Study of Wireless Sensor Networks for Urban
Traffic Monitoring: Applications and Architectures.” Procedia Computer Science,
vol. 19, 2013, pp. 617–626., doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2013.06.082.
[25] Alvear, Oscar, et al. “Using UAV-Based Systems to Monitor Air Pollution in Areas
with Poor Accessibility.” Journal of Advanced Transportation, vol. 2017, 2017, pp.
1–14., doi:10.1155/2017/8204353.
[26] Debusk, Wesley. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems for Disaster Relief: Tornado
Alley.” AIAA Infotech@Aerospace 2010, 2010, doi:10.2514/6.2010-3506.
[27] Waharte, Sonia, and Niki Trigoni. “Supporting Search and Rescue Operations with
UAVs.” 2010 International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies, 2010,
doi:10.1109/est.2010.31.
[28] Guillen-Perez, Antonio, et al. “Wi-Fi Networks on Drones”. 2016 ITU
Kaleidoscope: ICTs for a Sustainable World (ITU WT), 2016, doi:10.1109/ituwt.2016.7805730.
[29] Amazon prime air delivery using drones to deliver the ordered packages,
https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Prime-Air/b?ie=UTF8&node=8037720011
[Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].
[30] Iraqi
insurgents
hacked
predator
drone
http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/12/17/drone.video.hacked/index.html
20-Jun-2021].

102

feeds,
[Accessed:

[31]

The Computer virus infects drone plane command centre US,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/oct/09/virus-infects-drone-planecommand [Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].

[32] Wikipedia contributors. (2021, April 15). Iran–U.S. RQ-170 incident. Wikipedia.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93U.S._RQ-170_incident.
[Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].
[33]

The
Predator
drone
live
video
feeds
exposed
online,
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/government/us-government-leavespredator-drone-video-feeds-exposed-online/ [Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].

[34] N. M. Rodday, R. D. O. Schmidt, A. Pras. "Exploring security vulnerabilities of
unmanned aerial vehicles", NOMS 2016-2016 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and
Management Symposium, pp. 993-994, Apr 2016.
[35] J. S. Pleban, R. Band, R. Creutzburg, R. Creutzburg, D. Akopian, "Hacking and
securing the AR.Drone 2.0 quadcopter: Investigations for improving the security of
a toy", International Society for Optics and Photonics, pp. 90300L, feb 2014.
[36] Rani C, Modares H, Sriram R, Mikulski D, Lewis FL (2016): Security of unmanned
aerial vehicle systems against cyber-physical attacks. Journal of Defense Modeling
and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology 2016, Vol. 13(3) pp. 331–
342 The Author(s) 2015 DOI: 10.1177/1548512915617252.
[37] K. Hartmann, C. Steup, "The vulnerability of UAVs to cyber-attacks an approach
to the risk assessment", Cyber Conflict (CyCon) 2013 5th International Conference
on, pp. 1-23, 2013.
[38] Goppert, James, et al. “Numerical Analysis of Cyberattacks on Unmanned Aerial
Systems.” Infotech@Aerospace 2012, 2012, doi:10.2514/6.2012-2437.
[39] R. Mitchell, I.-R. Chen, "Adaptive intrusion detection of malicious unmanned air
vehicles using behavior rule specifications", IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern. Syst.,
vol. 44, no. 5, pp. 593-604, May 2014.
[40] “Wi-Fi.”, Microchip Developer Help, http://microchipdeveloper.com/wifi:start
(accessed 12 May 2018) [Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].
[41] Compton, Stuart: 802.11 Denial of Service Attacks and Mitigation, SANS Institute
InfoSec Reading Room. [Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].
[42] Aircrack-ng, https://www.aircrack-ng.org/ [Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].

103

[43] RPI-Wireless-Hotspot
for raspberry pi
to convert into router,
https://github.com/harryallerston/RPI-Wireless-Hotspot [Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].
[44] Robot Operating System, http://www.ros.org/about-ros/ (accessed 16 June 2018)
[Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].
[45] WPA2 encryption, https://github.com/daraosn/ardrone-wpa2 [Accessed: 20-Jun2021].
[46] Kismet wireless intrusion detection system for drone,
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kismetwireless/kismet/master/README
[Accessed: 20-Jun-2021].
[47] D. Kewley, R. Fink, J. Lowry, and M. Dean, “Dynamic approaches to thwart
adversary intelligence gathering,” in DARPA Information Survivability
Conference & Exposition II, 2001. DISCEX’01. Proceedings, IEEE (2001), vol. 1,
pp. 176–185.
[48] J. Michalski, C. Price, E. Stanton, E. Lee, K. Chua, Y. Wong, and C. Tan, “Network
security mechanisms utilizing dynamic network address translation” (2002).
[49] J. Li, P.L. Reiher, and G.J. Popek, “Resilient self-organizing overlay networks for
security update delivery,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
22(1), pp. 189–202 (2004).
[50] H. Moniz, N.F. Neves, M. Correia, and P. Verissimo, “Randomized intrusiontolerant asynchronous services,” in Dependable Systems and Networks, 2006. DSN
2006. International Conference on, IEEE (2006), pp. 568–577.
[51] S. Antonatos, P. Akritidis, E.P. Markatos, and K.G. Anagnostakis, “Defending
against hitlist worms using network address space randomization,” Computer
Networks 51(12), pp. 3471–3490 (2007).
[52] E. Al-Shaer, “Toward network configuration randomization for moving target
defense,” in Moving Target Defense, Springer, pp. 153–159 (2011).
[53] J.D. Touch, G.G. Finn, Y.S. Wang, and L. Eggert, “DynaBone: Dynamic defense
using multilayer internet overlays,” in DARPA Information Survivability
Conference and Exposition, 2003. Proceedings, IEEE (2003), vol. 2, pp. 271–276.
[54] “AFRL resources,” Personal communication.
[55] E. Al-Shaer, Q. Duan, and J. Jafarian, Random Host Mutation for Moving Target
Defense, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 310–327 (2013).
104

[56] Y.B. Luo, B.S. Wang, X.F. Wang, X.F. Hu, and G.L. Cai, “TPAH: A universal and
multiplatform deployable port and address hopping mechanism,” in 2015
International Conference on Information and Communications Technologies, IET
(2015), pp. 1–6.
[57] J. Jafarian, E. Al-Shaer, and Q. Duan, “Openflow random host mutation:
Transparent moving target defense using software-defined networking,” in
Proceedings of the First Workshop on Hot Topics in Software Defined Networks,
ACM (2012), pp. 127–132.
[58] J. Jafarian, E. Al-Shaer, and Q. Duan, “Spatio-temporal address mutation for
proactive cyber agility against sophisticated attackers,” in Proceedings of the First
ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense, ACM (2014), pp. 69–78.
[59] S. Shin, V. Yegneswaran, P. Porras, and G. Gu, “Avant-guard: Scalable and vigilant
switch flow management in software-defined networks,” in Proceedings of the
2013 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM (2013),
pp. 413–424.
[60] R. Skowyra and D. Bigelow, “Dynamic flow isolation: Adaptive access control to
protect networks,” Cyber Security Division Transition to Practice Technology
Guide (2016).
[61] Vengainathan, B., Basil, A., Tassinari, M., Manral, V., & Banks, S. (2018).
Benchmarking Methodology for Software-Defined Networking (SDN) Controller
Performance. RFC, 8456, 1-64.
[62] C. Gudla and A. H. Sung, "Moving Target Defense Discrete Host Address Mutation
and Analysis in SDN," 2020 International Conference on Computational Science
and Computational Intelligence (CSCI), 2020, pp. 55-61, doi:
10.1109/CSCI51800.2020.00017.

105

